JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. If anthropology has any practical contribution to make towards solving the problem of famine, at least part of this contribution must lie in showing how complex is the relationship between a particular set of environmental circumstances and the culture of a particular community. For one cannot know the extent of an environmental crisis (or even that one exists), nor appreciate the likely consequences of a particular intervention, without appreciating the role of culture, both in determining what particular combination of circumstances constitutes a crisis, and in governing a people's response to it. Culture, in other words, is not a mere object, acted upon by nature, but a subject which constitutes or gives meaning to nature. One way of showing this would be to describe the history of a particular relief or rehabilitation programme and to show how it failed to achieve its objectives and/or led to unintended and undesired consequences, because the cultural complexities of the situation were not adequately understood. Another, and for obvious reasons, less common wav is to show how a particular people have responded, in the absence of outside attempts to sustain or change their way of life, to ecological pressures which have pushed them close to the limits of their adaptive capacity. It is a case of this kind that I present here. The Mursi number about five thousand and live in the Lower Omo Valley of southwestern Ethiopia, sixty miles north of Lake Turkana. Their economy is based upon the integration of three main subsistence activities, rain-fed cultivation, flood-retreat cultivation and cattle herding. None of these is sufficient in itself, nor even in combination with one of the other two, to provide a regular and reliable subsistence, but each makes a vital contribution to the overall viability of the economy. To understand the different and complementary constraints which affect the exploitation of these three productive resources is to understand the adaptive success of the Mursi economy and the extremity of the conditions which have brought it, in recent years, close to the point of collapse.
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The early 1970s
The Mursi number about five thousand and live in the Lower Omo Valley of southwestern Ethiopia, sixty miles north of Lake Turkana. Their economy is based upon the integration of three main subsistence activities, rain-fed cultivation, flood-retreat cultivation and cattle herding. None of these is sufficient in itself, nor even in combination with one of the other two, to provide a regular and reliable subsistence, but each makes a vital contribution to the overall viability of the economy. To understand the different and complementary constraints which affect the exploitation of these three productive resources is to understand the adaptive success of the Mursi economy and the extremity of the conditions which have brought it, in recent years, close to the point of collapse.
There is no shortage of land for rain-fed cultivation, but rainfall is both low (an annual mean of around 400 mm) and, more to the point, highly unreliable in occurrence, distribution and intensity. If there is a sufficiently heavy and prolonged fall of rain in March or early April, sorghum (the main crop) will ripen in ten weeks and will be ready for harvesting in twelve. If the rain is even a few weeks late, the crop may not have enough time to reach maturity before it is destroyed by a prolonged spell of hot dry weather in July and August. Always eager, for this reason, to get their seed into the ground as soon as possible, the cultivators may misjudge the onset of the main rains, planting after a 'false alarm*, only to find that a dry spell follows, leaving the seeds with insufficient moisture to germinate successfully. (It makes good 'scientific' sense to plant immediately after the first fall of rain, since the effect of this rain is to release, all of a sudden, the nutrients that have been stored in the soil during the dry season, making them available, at a high level, for seed germination). It is also possible for a promising harvest to be drastically reduced by a short burst of heavy rain a few weeks before the sorghum is ready to be cut.
Sorghum is also the main crop cultivated by means of flood-retreat cultivation. It is planted along the banks of the Omo as the flood recedes in September and October and harvested at the height of the dry season in November and December. Since only land which has actually been inundated can be cultivated by this method, and since the area liable to flooding is limited, along this stretch of the Omo, to small pockets and strips on the banks themselves, the potential harvest from flood-retreat cultivation is never as great as from rain cultivation. But since the fertility of flood land is annually renewed by the deposition of silt, and since the annual rise and fall of the Omo is controlled not by the erratic local rainfall but by the heavy 'summer rains' which fall over its highland catchment area, flood cultivation is far more reliable.
Although that section of the population which has the highest mortality rate at the best of times must have been enormous.4 What had brought about this disastrous situation? The simple and largely correct answer is a failure of the rains for three years running (1971, 1972 and 1973) , something which my informants had never experienced before, together with very low Omo flood levels over the same period. The consequent hunger helped to bring about and was, in turn, exacerbated by inter-group fighting on a large scale, which affected all the herding peoples ofathe Lower Omo during the early seventies.5 The Mursi were chiefly involved in raiding and counter-raiding with their northern neighbours, the Bodi, with whom they had been on terms of peaceful co-operation since the early fifties. This increased the food shortage in a number of ways. Firstly, in order to make the cattle less vulnerable to Bodi raiders, the Mursi kept them well away from some of their best grazing areas in the north of their country and confined them instead to the eastern fringes of the tsetse infested Omo bushbelt. Secondly, they abandoned both raid-fed and flood-retreat cultivation areas in this border area. Thirdly, the hostilities affected communications with highlands markets, the only source of grain. People travelling to and from these -markets were regularly ambushed and killed. It would be going much too far to say that warfare, by interrupting normal subsistence and trading activities, was the main cause of the food shortage, but there is no doubt that the Mursi were less able to deal with it than they would have been had their external relations, especially with the Bodi, been peaceful.
Apart from two isolated distributions of famine relief in September and December 1973, the Mursi received no outside assistance during the first and most disastrous three years of the 1970's. The single most important factor which enabled them, as a group, to survive this crisis, was undoubtedly access to grain through market exchange in the highlands. All manner of items were taken up to the highlands to be bartered or sold-rifles, agricultural implements, tobacco, hides, honey and even walking sticks. But, in their own estimation, it was the ability to exchange cattle for grain which differentiated, more than anything else, between those who survived and those who did not. So desperate were some people to obtain cattle for this purpose that they took back by force cattle they had paid in bridewealth, thereby divorcing themselves in the process. It is difficult to think of a more telling indication than this of the severe strain imposed by the famine on social relations. For the rights and 
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obligations arising out of bridewealth debt not only ramify among a wide variety of kin and affines but have a time depth of three generations. In 'normal' times, the system of reciprocity thus established plays a vital part in the equitable distribution of scarce resources6 but so great was this crisis that, for some people at least, it was no longer possible to wait for reciprocity to be achieved in its own time. They therefore began turning their long term, intangible assets claims on the property of others based upon past exchanges into short term tangible ones. Having lost confidence in the natural order of things, they had lost confidence in the social order as well. Indeed, some people predicted that, since the rain appeared to have deserted their country for good, they would eventually have to do the same. Once the food had arrived by lorry at the distribution point, it was divided into individual loads and given out to all-comers who then carried it back to their home settlements. This procedure was presumably adopted out of sheer necessity, there being insufficient staff and equipment available to set up elaborate distribution centres of the 'soup kitchen' variety, but its benefits were obvious. First, the food was distributed with maximum speed, secondly, those most in need of it were not forced to make a long and potentially fatal journey to the distribution point and, thirdly, because they were not forced to remain at a feeding station to receive daily handouts, people were not taken away for long periods from their essential subsistence activities. Thus, there was not created an ever-growing settlement of 'refugees', permanently dependent on food aid, and it was precisely because such a 'famine camp' was not created that the way was left open for the Mursi to take their most drastic step so far to secure their long term future: a change from mobile semi-pastoralism to a permanently settled agricultural way of life.
In 1979 Such were the pressures on both sides to reach a settlement that one was quickly achieved, despite the lack of a common language and shared cultural value and despite the deep distrust and hostility which traditionally exists between them. It was proposed by the Mursi, and agreed by the Ari, that in future any Mursi taking honey to market in Berka should be treated as a thief by the Ari and handed over to the police if he did not carry a letter stating where the honey had been gathered and confirming that it had not been taken from a honey barrel. This letter would be written by the only member of the Mago settlement who could read and write Amharic (a man who had learnt to do so while serving a two year prison sentence in Jinka) and it would be 'signed' by the ritual head or priest (Komoru) of the Mago settlement. This letter would be addressed to the headman of the nearest Ari village, who would give the bearer another letter to take on to Berka and show the police. This 'honey pass' system, began to operate while we were living in the settlement last year and appeared to be working well. I provided the necessary paper and pens, to start with, but a charge of twenty to thirty cents per pass was soon imposed to cover the cost of these materials which would subsequently have to be bought in Berka.
The discussions which led to this for the Mursi at least totally novel arrangement were of great interest because they showed the politically more influential members of the Mago settlement using their rhetoric to resolve for their audience the conflict between traditional values and the 'untraditional' behaviour represented by the migration. Their speeches were devoted, not to the dispassionate analysis of various possible courses of action, but to strengthening the commitment of the migrants to the new life they had chosen for themselves in the Mago Valley. The problem they were grappling with was how to legitimise and justify the migration, in terms of traditional values, despite the fact that it represented, to some The problem of how to save lives, through the distribution of food aid, without destroying a way of life, obviously requires different solutions, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is now widely recognized, however, that the aim in all cases should be to make as much use as possible of existing channels for the exchange and distribution of scarce resources-to 'enhance', as the jargon has it, 'indigenous coping mechanisms'. These mechanisms will, among a people such as the Mursi, be closely bound up with institutionalised behaviour of a kind which cannot be unambiguously labelled 'economic', it being a characteristic of such societies that economic institutions are not segregated from kinship, political and religious ones. If, therefore, the distribution of food at a time of extreme shortage is made to bypass the local distributive network, the effect will be to deprive many connected institutions of an important part of 341 MURSI RESPONSE TO DROUGHT their raison d'etre. Food aid, if it is distributed through the ehannels which already exist for the alloeation of scaree resourees, ean put new life, not only into the people themselves but also into their ailing soeial institutions. The Mursi were fortunate, therefore, that this was how the food that was brought to them by the RRC during the past few years was distributed: it was taken to a place as close as possible to the affected population, the able bodied members of which were then allowed to earry it back to their home settlements. The advantages of this method were outlined earlier. The food was distributed with maximum speed, the weakest members of the population were not forced to make a long and potentially fatal journey to the distribution point and people were not taken away for long periods from their subsistence activities particularly cultivation, which is mainly the responsibility of women. But, as I also pointed out) these beneficial effects were achieved more by accident than design: had more equipment, staff and medical supplies been available it is quite likely that a 'famine camp' would have been established, aimed principally at saving the lives of children, but to which virtually the whole Mursi population might have gravitated. The principal justification for this would have been the need to ensure that the limited amount of food available found its way to those most in need of it, the assumption being that outsiders in this case relief agency staff are in a better position than the people themselves to decide, during times of crisis, who among them are most in need of help. This assumption is questionable both on practical and ethical grounds.
The practical problem concerns the anthropometric methods used for identifying 'at risk' individuals (weight-for-height, arm circumferencefor-height, etc). Although undoubtedly very useful in the rapid assessment of the nutritional status of whole communities, these methods are crude when it comes to selecting needy individuals, unless accompanied by skilled, experienced (and therefore expensive) clinical observation.8 The best demonstration of this I know of is a report by Chen and others9 of an anthropometric survey of 2,019 children. Since this survey was not followed up by treatment, it was possible to ascertain, by noting how many of the children had died two years later, what proportion of at risk children would have been reached by an emergency feeding programme based upon the initial survey. If, for example, such a programme had been started with enough food to feed 500 children, and the anthropometric survey had been used to select the 500 most needy, these would have included less than half of the 112 children who died within the next two years. These results, if they hold elsewhere, suggest that anthropometry is a pretty inefficient method of screening. But even if there were no such practical problems, the outsider would still not be in a better position, morally, than the people themselves, to decide who among them should be given priority in the distribution of a limited supply of food. Decisions of this kind are not based, in any community, on an objective assessment of need but on a set of generally unspoken, because taken for granted, moral values. Decisions made by agency staff will be based on values which are taken for granted in highly developed industrial societies and which may not, therefore, be entirely compatible with those which are taken for granted in the communities which are the major recipients of food aid.
Another objection that might be raised against the method of emergency food distribution which was successfully, if fortuitously, adopted by the RRC in the Mago Valley, is that it could undermine the self-reliance of the recipients. Even though the evil consequences of 'famine camps' are now widely recognised, this recognition has, it seems, persuaded governments and voluntary agencies alike that any form of 'free relieS is to be avoided. This is seen in the rush of agencies to get out of relief and into rehabilitation and in attempts to link relief, when it is given, to development projects, usually through food-for-work programmes. But, provided the method of food distribution does not draw people away from their own subsistence activities and provided, therefore, they are left to decide for themselves how it should be allocated to needy individuals, there seems no good reason to believe that they would literally down tools and make themselves dependent on handouts. This is born out by the history of Mursi response to drought over the past thirteen years. They clearly did not need to be persuaded to do the work necessary to provide for themselves by means of cultivation and if they had been fed only on condition that they did some other work (difficult as it is to imagine what, and how it might have benefited them) they would have had to give up their own subsistence activities and might, therefore, have become dependent on handouts indefinitely. A food-for-work programme could, in other words, have produced precisely the result it was intended to avoid.
The idea that 'free relief' is, in principle, a bad thing is based, I believe, not only on the widely recognised evil consequences of the 'soup kitchen' method of distribution, but also on cultural prejudice: the idea that people such as the Mursi lack the motivation and/or resourcefulness to work out new solutions to the problems of their own economic self-sufficiency. This brings me to the question of 'rehabilitation'. I use inverted commas here because I believe the word itself is dangerous. k contains the implicit assumption that the people to be 'rehabilitated' have already lost the ability to 'stand on their own feet', an assumption which is dangerous, if Those who draw these boundaries, following such natural features as rivers and mountain ranges, are either ignorant (like the adviser just mentioned) of the fact that in doing so they are bisecting and truncating environmental resources which have been integrated into viable economic systems; or else they regard those who have built up these systems as having no right to be consulted about their possible destruction. It was this lack of consultation which the Mursi found most baffling about their exclusion from the Mui area. It was not, they said, the fact that their land was wanted by others that surprised them, but the fact that it should have been taken from them by people who 'kept their lips shut'. Apart from the injustice of this, it may well be questioned whether the creation of a 'wilderness' (a word frequently, and inappropriately, applied by wild life enthusiasts to the Lower Omo Valley) as a playground for rich, foreign tourists is a form of development in which Ethiopia, or any other African country threatened by famine, can really afford to engage. The main beneficiaries of such development are likely to be the already well off urban elite, while it is by no means self evident that endangered animal species can only be saved, in Africa of all places, by setting aside large areas from which all human occupation is excluded. African subsistence hunters, farmers and herders have, after all, been living with and utilising wild animals for thousands of years without exterminating them indeed they have learnt to do precisely the opposite for the sake of their own survival. Having destroyed large parts of our own natural environment, we in the industrialized world have exported our concern to such places as Africa, declaring that areas should be set aside there where the 'rights' of animals are sacrosanct. Meanwhile, legislation to prevent the further destruction of our own countryside is consistently and successfully opposed, with little popular outcry. The national park concept has been foisted upon Africa by a guilty Europe and is irrelevant to the fundamental problems Rof African development. 1 l 11. This was poignantly illustrated for me by an incident that occurred while I was at the Omo National Park Headquarters on the River Mui in April 1981. I was sitting in the Warden's office one morning, looking out through the open doorway at a group of four or five men who were standing, thin and bedraggled, in a drizzle of rain, exchanging a kind of tragicomic banter with the game guards. They were Chai, a people who speak the same language as the Mursi but who live west of the Omo and south of Maji. The Chai have probably suffered even more during the recent years of drought than the Mursi. These men were about to leave Mui after spending a few days living on food given to them by the game guards. One of them, who looked the weakest, said, only half jokingly, that if he were not given food for the journey he would be a corpse before he arrived home. Above the inside of the doorway that framed this little group, forming a kind of caption to the picture, were these words in large black letters: 'Wild life is our national asset'.
